Biologist Richard Dawkins, in his book The Blind Watchmaker, wrote the following:
The theory of evolution by cumulative natural selection is the only theory we know of that is, in principle, capable of explaining the existence of organized complexity. Even if the evidence did not favour it, it would still be the best theory available.
In this essay, we discuss physicist Lee Smolin’s attempt to extend natural selection from
biology and apply it to the cosmos as a whole in order to explain fine tuning in physics.
We start by discussing black holes and baby universes and end with what Smolin calls the meta-laws dilemma.
Highlights of this essay:
Alternative Theories
Since multiverse attempts to explain three distinct and striking features of our universe - namely fine tuning, design, and order - which all seem to point to an intelligent cause, the failure of multiverse reintroduces three separate arguments in favor of an intelligent cause of our universe.
While in prior essays we quoted physicists Lee Smolin, Paul Steinhardt, and Roger Penrose in their rejection of the multiverse, in the spirit of intellectual honesty, we must acknowledge that these scientists don’t view the rejection of multiverse as a support for an intelligent cause. Rather, they each formulate an alternative scientific theory to explain one of the unique features of our universe without an intelligent cause.
It’s important to note that because fine tuning, design, and order are qualitatively different from one another, explaining one of them without recourse to an intelligent cause doesn't explain the other two at all.
This essay will examine Smolin’s Cosmological Natural Selection. This theory attempts to explain the fine tuning of the constants without an intelligent cause but doesn’t address the low entropy initial conditions or the design of the laws of nature.
The other two theories, Steinhardt’s Bouncing Cosmology and Penrose’s Conformal Cyclic Cosmology will be the subject of the next two essays. Both of these theories attempt to explain the low entropy initial conditions of the Big Bang, but don’t address the fine tuning of the constants or the design of the laws of nature.
In contrast to an infinite varied multiverse, these three theories all adhere to the standard definition of science and attempt to explain surprising features of our universe in a manner that makes testable predictions. Nevertheless, by their creators’ own admission, they are all highly speculative theories with little to no evidence, and as a result of their various flaws are outside the mainstream views of current physicists and cosmologists.
Smolin, Steinhardt, and Penrose are among the very best thinkers in modern-day physics and cosmology. Seeing the highly speculative nature of their theories will highlight the fact that explaining fine tuning, design, and order are substantial problems that don’t have any easy or conservative solutions. This will further reinforce your conviction that we aren’t missing any reasonable possibilities, and that an intelligent cause is the correct and straightforward implication of fine tuning, design, and order of our one universe.
Biological and Cosmological Natural Selection
Let’s now consider the creative explanation for fine tuning proposed by Lee Smolin in his 1992 book, The Life of the Cosmos. Smolin was one of the first to recognize the significant problem posed by the discovery of fine tuning of the constants (what he calls the parameters). Drawing inspiration from the theory of biological evolution, he suggests what he considers to be the only scientific path to explain these immense cosmic coincidences.
Smolin writes as follows (page 105):
The key point, it seems to me, is how seriously we should take the observation that our universe is very highly structured, compared to universes with most other values of the parameters. Should we take this as some kind of cosmic coincidence, or should we see this as something that needs to be explained?
I would argue that there are not many options, if we restrict ourselves to an explanation that can be subject to experimental test and that stays within the usual framework of causal explanation. To quote Richard Dawkins, in The Blind Watchmaker, "The theory of evolution by cumulative natural selection is the only theory we know of that is, in principle, capable of explaining the existence of organized complexity. Even if the evidence did not favour it, it would still be the best theory available."
The proposal I've made here may not hold up to test. But once we begin to seek a scientific explanation for the values of the parameters that does not ignore the fact that the actual values produce a universe much more structured and complex than typical values, it may be difficult to ignore the possibility that cosmology must incorporate some mechanism analogous to natural selection.”
Smolin’s idea is to borrow the mechanism of natural selection used to explain design in biology and apply the same type of solution to explain the fine tuning of the constants in physics.
Before describing Smolin’s theory, let’s give a brief summary of natural selection in biology. One of the main concepts is that what seems like design can be largely explained by the existence of a nearly perfect replicator (DNA) with a very long time to evolve. Variations between generations, caused by small mutations in the DNA code, enable natural selection to operate. This is because those offspring that are most fit for survival in a particular environment will have more offspring than their competitors. Consequently, over time, advantageous traits will be selected for and will naturally spread throughout the population.
Smolin extends biological natural selection to the cosmic realm with black holes playing the role in physics that living organisms do in biology.
Before we go any further, let's explain what black holes are and why they are relevant to Smolin’s theory. A black hole is an aggregate of matter that’s compressed into a small enough volume so that its gravitational attraction is too strong for anything, even light, to escape its immediate vicinity. Because we can only see things by observing the light they emit, it’s physically impossible to ever observe from outside a black hole what happens inside it. For those who aren’t as familiar with physics, black holes are completely black because light can’t escape from inside of them.
At the center of every black hole is a singularity - a point of infinite density where the known laws of physics break down, making it impossible to calculate what happens. The mystery about black hole singularities and the inability to observe what’s going on inside them sets the stage for Smolin’s speculation about what actually occurs.
Don’t worry if you don’t understand exactly what a black hole singularity is. The key point is that it’s anyone’s guess what occurs inside black holes because it’s impossible to directly observe them and physicists can’t calculate what happens at their center. This makes the inside of black holes ripe for speculation. With that introduction, we’re ready to discuss Smolin’s theory.
The Three Premises of Cosmological Natural Selection
While Smolin’s theory is different from multiverse theories, as we’ll soon explain, it contains analogs to the three premises that enable a multiverse theory to explain fine tuning. As such, we’ll present Cosmological Natural Selection and its explanation of fine tuning through developing its three premises.
1. A New Universe is Born Inside Every Black Hole
In his 2013 book, Time Reborn (page 124), Smolin states the first premise as follows:
The basic hypothesis of cosmological natural selection is that universes reproduce by the creation of new universes inside black holes. Our universe is thus a descendant of another universe, born in one of its black holes, and every black hole in our universe is the seed of a new universe. This is a scenario within which we can apply the principles of natural selection.
The first premise of Cosmological Natural Selection is the conjecture that new universes are formed inside black holes. The main justification for this is that both the inside of a black hole and the universe at the time of the Big Bang are thought to be singularities - points of infinite energy density. Therefore, Smolin speculates that when gravity causes matter to collapse into a black hole, a new universe is born from a hypothesized bounce inside. Theoretically, this happens inside every black hole, with each bounce representing a new big bang and a new universe.
If this is true, we can think of the universe with the black hole as the parent universe and the new universe that is born inside the black hole as its offspring. This first premise of Cosmological Natural Selection is analogous to the Infinite Multiverse Premise in that it provides a basis for the existence of infinitely many universes (or at least an arbitrarily large number of them).
2. The Constants Vary Slightly Each Time a New Universe is Born
Smolin’s second premise is analogous to the Varied Multiverse Premise - that the values of the constants vary between different universes. Namely, Smolin suggests that there exists a meta-law that ensures each time a new universe is born inside a black hole, the values of the offspring’s constants deviate from its parent universe by a small random amount. He calls it a meta-law because it governs changes in the fundamental constants, or parameters, of the laws of nature.
In his book The Life of the Cosmos (page 94), Smolin attempts to justify this premise:
For the time being, given our ignorance about physics in the extreme conditions of a bounce, we should make the simplest possible hypotheses, and see if they lead to predictions that can be compared to the real world. The simplest hypothesis I know of is to assume that the basic form of the laws don't change during the bounce, so that the standard model of particle physics describes the world both before and after the bounce. However, I will assume that the parameters of the standard model do change during the bounce. How do they change? In the absence of any definite information, I will postulate only that these changes are small and random.
While Smolin acknowledges that the simplest assumption about what happens each time a new universe is born is that the laws and constants of nature would stay exactly the same, he knows that if that were true, his theory would be unable to explain fine tuning.
Therefore, he deviates from the simplest possible hypothesis and posits that while the basic form of the laws doesn’t change during the bounce, the constants of nature randomly change a little bit. While this assumption is highly questionable, we’ll let it slide for now.
In crafting his theory, Smolin very cleverly identifies the necessary elements in the theory of biological evolution and proposes analogs in physics to each of these elements, thereby constructing a theory of cosmological natural selection. Let’s see how this works.
In biology, small random mutations occur to the DNA each time a parent organism produces offspring. These mutations provide the variation that allows natural selection to give rise to the evolution of complex life.
Analogously, in physics, Smolin suggests that small random changes occur to the constants each time a parent universe produces a new universe in a black hole. These changes provide the variation that allows cosmological natural selection to give rise to the evolution of complex universes like our own.
In biological natural selection, those genes that code for organisms most fit to survive and reproduce in their environment will naturally produce the largest number of offspring with similar DNA. Therefore, as the process of reproduction goes on for many, many generations, the Earth will be populated by the organisms best suited for survival in their respective environments.
Analogously, according to Cosmological Natural Selection, those universes that have values of the constants that promote the formation of the most black holes will naturally have the largest number of offspring universes with similar constants. Therefore, if we imagine the process of universe generation going on for many, many generations, it will turn out that the typical universe will have constants that are optimal for the production of black holes.
It’s important to note that it's crucial for the success of biological natural selection that the mutations result in small changes to the offspring from one generation to the next. Likewise, in Smolin’s cosmological natural selection, it’s not enough to posit that the constants change in each offspring universe; it’s also necessary that these changes are small.
Smolin clearly spells out this important point as follows (page 103):
Natural selection only works in biology because the changes in the organisms that result from mutations and sexual recombination are small. This is necessary not only to preserve the fitness of organisms from one generation to the next, but to make possible the development of greater fitness through the accumulation of incremental changes. If the changes in the parameters of universes are small, then the same will be true in cosmology. It is not enough to assume merely that the parameters change upon creation of the new universe. If the parameters of each universe were chosen randomly, with no relation to the previous universe, then it would not be possible to explain anything. The assumption that the changes in parameters are small is the crucial idea that makes it possible to rest a scientific theory on the idea that new universes are created from black holes.
3. Our Universe is Optimized for Black Holes
Smolin’s first two premises imply that the typical universe has constants that are optimal for black hole production. But this doesn't directly say anything about our universe. However, since our observed universe is a random member of the collection of universes, it should be a typical universe. Therefore, Smolin’s final premise claims that our universe has constants that are optimized for the greatest number of black holes.
Smolin describes this third premise, which is analogous to multiverse’s Typical Universe Premise, as follows (page 101):
We need only make one additional hypothesis, which is that our universe is a typical member of the collection. Then we can conclude that the parameters that govern our universe must also have parameters that are close to one of the peaks of the production of black holes.
While this may sound good, you might wonder why our fine tuned universe doesn’t seem to be full of black holes - instead, it seems to be full of many other complex structures like galaxies, planets, and life.
Smolin’s answer to this question is that the observed values of our constants, which are primarily optimized for producing black holes, coincidentally also happen to produce all the complexity, structure, and order in our universe. In other words, the optimal values for the formation of black holes also happen to be the values that produce all the complex structures found in our universe, such as atoms, molecules, planets, stars, galaxies, and life.
Putting it all together, Smolin’s theory is based on three premises:
New universes are formed inside black holes;
There’s a meta-law that determines that the constants randomly change slightly with the formation of each new universe;
Our universe’s constants are the ideal values for maximizing black holes.
Given these three premises, Smolin argues that the appearance of fine tuning in our complex universe is not based upon an intelligent fine tuner. Instead, it’s merely the result of the blind process of cosmological natural selection, with black holes being the one thing whose production is maximized, and with all the other features of our complex universe coming along for the ride.
Not a Genuine Multiverse
You may be thinking that Smolin’s theory sounds a lot like an infinite varied multiverse. It has a near-infinite number of universes, the constants vary, and it even has something like the typical universe premise. But Smolin hates the multiverse and thinks it’s not science! Why is his theory any better?
That's a good question. Even though Smolin posits the existence of many varied universes, his theory is not a genuine multiverse (which is a good thing). This is because according to the theory of cosmological natural selection, the large majority of the universes are ordered.
This is a subtle point. Let’s elucidate this important conceptual distinction between Cosmological Natural Selection and multiverse theory, and thereby illustrate why Smolin doesn’t run into the devastating measure problem.
According to the Varied Multiverse Premise, the constants in multiverse’s infinitely many universes vary randomly, resulting in every set of constants randomly appearing infinitely many times. Since anything and everything will happen in an infinite varied multiverse, the theory only works if it posits the additional premise that our universe is a typical universe with intelligent observers. Without the Typical Universe Premise, multiverse becomes subject to all the problems that beset a naive multiverse, as we discussed in essay 6.
The problem then becomes that in an infinite varied multiverse, there’s no natural way to evaluate the likelihood of the different universes and thereby determine that our universe is in fact typical. The only way to accomplish such a task is to artificially introduce ad hoc measures to weight the different universes. This supposition leads directly to the devastating measure problem we discussed in essay 10. This is for regular multiverse theories.
However, in Cosmological Natural Selection, the variation of universes is not random but follows a path of natural selection. Since universes are formed in black holes, the slight variation of the constants in each new universe will yield a natural path leading to a typical universe being maximized for black holes. As such, the weighting of universes towards those with many black holes is not an ad hoc premise but follows naturally from the theory. There’s no need to introduce an ad hoc measure to make a quantitative evaluation of probabilities and thereby yield a typical universe; rather, the qualitative nature of the theory automatically generates a prediction for what the typical universe should look like.
Problems With All Three Premises
Though Cosmological Natural Selection is conceptually superior to multiverse theories, it has its own problems. The first set of problems comes from the fact that all three of its premises are unsupported and highly questionable, as pointed out by other scientists. The next problem is that it makes a false prediction. And the last problem is that its all-important meta-law is itself fine tuned. Let's start by discussing the weaknesses of Smolin’s three premises.
Roger Penrose, in his book The Road to Reality (page 761), critiques Smolin's first two premises - that new universes are created in black holes and that the constants change slightly with every bounce. Penrose writes as follows:
I have quite a lot of trouble with both the Wheeler and the Smolin proposals. In the first place, there is the extremely speculative nature of the key idea that some presently unknown physics can not only convert the spacetime singularity of collapse into a ‘bounce’, but also slightly readjust the fundamental physical constants when this happens. I know of no justification from known physics to suggest such an extrapolation. But, to my mind, it is even more geometrically implausible that the highly irregular singularities that result from collapse can magically convert themselves into (or glue themselves to) the extraordinarily smooth and uniform Big Bang that each new universe would need if it is to acquire a respectable Second Law of the kind that we are familiar with.
As that quote is a real mouthful, let’s try to simplify it. Regarding Smolin’s first premise, the identification of the inside of a black hole with a new big bang, Penrose points out that a black hole and the big bang are essentially different. Let's clarify that a bit.
Penrose’s problem with Smolin’s first premise is that while both the inside of a black hole and a big bang are singularities, they are nonetheless completely different in terms of entropy. As we discussed in essay 9 of series one, a black hole is a point of maximum entropy, while the Big Bang is a point of incredibly low entropy. Insofar as they’re essentially different in this important regard, it’s highly dubious to equate them and thereby claim that new universes are formed inside black holes. The main point is that a black hole and the Big Bang are essentially different.
Let’s now explain Penrose’s critique of Smolin’s second premise that the constants slightly change in each newly formed universe. Essentially, Penrose calls out Smolin for “the extremely speculative nature of the key idea that some presently unknown physics…slightly readjust the fundamental physical constants.”
If you recall from the earlier quote, Smolin introduced his second premise by stating the simplest assumption - that the basic form of the laws doesn’t change in each bounce. Then he went on to postulate - without any justification whatsoever - that the constants do change slightly in each bounce. This supposition clearly deviates from his strategy of only making the simplest assumption - that everything stays the same. Why should the basic form of the laws remain the same, but the details slightly change?
Let’s now discuss Smolin’s third premise that our universe is optimized for producing black holes. In The Cosmic Landscape (page 361), Leonard Susskind criticizes this premise as follows:
There is no reason whatever to believe that we live in a universe that is maximally efficient at producing black holes. Smolin makes a series of tortured arguments to prove that any changes in our universe would result in fewer black holes, but I find them very unconvincing. We saw in chapter 5 that it is a lucky “miracle” that the universe is not catastrophically filled with black holes. A relatively small increase in the early lumpiness of the universe would cause almost all matter to collapse to black holes rather than life-nurturing galaxies and stars. Also, increasing the masses of the elementary particles would cause more black holes to form since they would be more susceptible to gravitational attraction. The real question is why the universe is so lacking in black holes. The answer that seems to me to make the most sense is that many, maybe most, pockets have far more black holes than our pocket, but they are violent places in which life could not have formed.
While Susskind went into some technicalities, his main point is that, if anything, it seems like the opposite of Smolin’s third premise is true - that our universe has much fewer black holes than the typical universe.
And Susskind isn’t alone in disputing Smolin’s claim that our universe’s constants are at their ideal values to maximize black hole production. For example, in physicist Alexander Vilenkin’s article On Cosmic Natural Selection (2006), he says:
The rate of black hole formation can be increased by increasing the value of the cosmological constant. This falsifies Smolin’s conjecture that the values of all constants of nature are adjusted to maximize black hole production.
We aren’t in a position to pick sides in the scientific debate between Smolin and other scientists over the claim that our constants are fine tuned to maximize black holes. Nevertheless, from a methodological perspective, the burden of proof is on Smolin.
This is because, even according to Smolin, the relationship between fine tuning for black holes and fine tuning for everything else is completely accidental. Without providing convincing evidence that our constants are fine tuned to maximize black holes - which he hasn’t done - the difficulty of positing this immense coincidence favors Susskind, Vilenkin, and others who maintain that Cosmological Natural Selection’s third premise is false.
Smolin’s False Prediction
Let’s move on to the next problem with Cosmological Natural Selection: that it makes a false prediction.
Because Smolin doesn’t rely on infinite randomness to produce coincidental order, like a standard multiverse does, his theory is capable of making a prediction, putting it into the realm of true science. In 1992, Smolin originally wrote that his theory predicted that a neutron star couldn’t be more than 1.6 times as massive as the sun.
Don’t worry if you don’t if you don’t know what a neutron star is or how that prediction follows from his theory. The main point is that Smolin’s theory made a concrete prediction.
And, while it’s very good for a scientific theory to make genuine predictions, it’s very bad for it to make false predictions. Unfortunately for Smolin, in 2010, astronomers observed a neutron star twice as massive as the sun, falsifying his prediction that the maximum possible size was 1.6 times the sun.
Then, in 2013, Smolin wrote in his book Time Reborn (page 281, footnote 7) that he was originally going to admit his theory had been falsified by this observation. However, after looking into the matter again, the experts realized that his theory tolerated a kaon-neutron star being just up to twice as massive as the sun, but no larger - exactly the limit of what had been observed.
Unfortunately, nine years later, in 2022, a massive neutron star was discovered with a mass of around 2.35 times as much as the Sun. While this would seem to conclusively falsify Cosmological Natural Selection, we don’t know if Smolin has responded to this observation or what the experts would say if they reexamined the situation once again.
The Fine Tuned Meta-Law
This brings us to the last problem with Cosmological Natural Selection. For the sake of argument, let’s ignore its false prediction and grant Smolin’s three unsupported premises despite his critics’ attacks. Even with all that, Cosmological Natural Selection is still not a viable solution to the problem of fine tuning because its meta-law itself is fine tuned.
To appreciate this point, let’s consider the specificity of Smolin’s hypothetical meta-law more closely. Notice that if the values of the constants in each offspring universe remained the same as those of its parent universe, then no cosmic evolution would take place. On the other hand, if the values of the constants in the offspring universe varied greatly from those of the parent universe, there would be no stability and fidelity between generations of universes. If so, instead of cosmic evolution, the process of generating new universes in black holes would result in a collection of universes with random values for their constants - more like a standard multiverse theory that requires a measure. As Smolin himself writes:
It is not enough to assume merely that the parameters change upon creation of the new universe. If the parameters of each universe were chosen randomly, with no relation to the previous universe, then it would not be possible to explain anything. The assumption that the changes in parameters are small is the crucial idea that makes it possible to rest a scientific theory on the idea that new universes are created from black holes.
In other words, for cosmological natural selection to work, the conjectured meta-law must itself be fine tuned to produce just the right amount of change in the constants from the parent universe to its offspring. Because the details of Smolin’s theory aren’t fully worked out, it’s impossible at this stage to say just how fine tuned the hypothetical meta-law would have to be. All we can say is that it would certainly have to be tuned so that the constants change a little bit, but not too much.
The irony is that even if Smolin’s theory were true, if we ask, “What fine tuned the meta-law?” the natural answer is that an intelligent cause fine tuned the meta-law to maximize black holes. Why would it do that? Maybe because it really likes black holes, or maybe because it intelligently realized that this will also achieve its true objective of producing a complex universe filled with atoms, molecules, planets, stars, galaxies, and life.
The fine tuned meta-law problem for Cosmological Natural Selection is yet another example of the same basic flaw that’s shared by many theories that attempt to explain our universe’s fine tuning, design, and order without an intelligent cause. Namely, it attempts to explain one special feature of our universe by showing how it emerges from another special feature of our universe.
Our main point is that little is gained by explaining the fine tuning of the constants of our known laws of nature by proposing a fine tuned meta-law. That merely begs the question of what fine tuned the meta-law itself. Ultimately, this regress must culminate in an intelligent cause that’s responsible for all the different levels of design and fine tuning throughout our amazing universe.
Summary of Problems with Cosmological Natural Selection
Let’s quickly review the problems with Smolin’s theory of Cosmological Natural Selection as an explanation of the fine tuned values of our constants without an intelligent cause or a multiverse.
The first set of problems came from the fact that all three of its premises are unsupported and highly questionable.
His first premise identified the inside of black holes with new big bangs but ignored the significant difference in entropy between them.
His second premise, that the basic form of the laws remains the same from parent universe to the baby universe but the constants slightly change, is entirely unjustified and flagrantly avoids the simplest assumption that the values of the constants also remain constant.
And, his third premise, that our universe is optimized for producing black holes, is called into question by other physicists. Furthermore, it posits an unexplained coincidence that those values that maximize black holes also happen to be those that are conducive to all the other structures and complexity in our universe.
Besides the weaknesses with all three premises, the next major problem came from a false prediction about the largest possible neutron star.
And the final problem came from the fact that Smolin’s all-important meta-law only works if it’s fine tuned to produce just the right amount of change in the constants every time a new universe is created.
While Cosmological Natural Selection is certainly a very creative attempt to extend the theory of biological evolution to the cosmic sphere, given all these problems, we think it’s clear that it’s not a viable explanation for fine tuning. Ultimately, once you realize the intrinsic flaws with the multiverse, the only remaining option to explain fine tuning is the very option that’s directly indicated by fine tuning: an intelligent cause.
The Meta-law Dilemma
Before moving on, we want to take a step back and consider what Smolin was hoping to accomplish through his theory of Cosmological Natural Selection. In doing so, we’ll analyze what he calls the meta-laws dilemma, a problem that would logically follow even if his theory were successful in explaining fine tuning. This analysis will elucidate the logical structure and power of the fine tuning argument.
The entire reason Smolin posits such a wild and speculative theory about baby universes being born inside black holes is that he, following in the footsteps of Leibniz, wants there to be a sufficient reason for everything in the universe without anything fundamental being left arbitrary, such as the laws, constants, or initial conditions. As Smolin wrote in Time Reborn (pgs. 115,119):
The new theory should answer the "Why these laws?" question. It must give us substantial insight into how and why the particular elementary particles and forces described in the Standard Model were selected. In particular, it must explain the special and improbable values of the fundamental constants that obtain in our universe — the parameters, like the masses of the elementary particles and the strengths of the various forces, that are specified by the Standard Model.
The new theory should answer the "Why these initial conditions?" question, explaining why our universe has properties that seem unusual when compared to the possible universes that might be described by the same laws. These are minimal requirements…
Facts about the world need to be explained, and a fact most in need of explanation is why particular laws are observed to hold in our universe.
For our purposes, let’s focus on the problem of explaining the constants of nature. Let’s begin with the mystery of the constants. How do you explain 25 seemingly arbitrary numbers like 1/137.035999? As we mentioned in Series 1 essay 2, Richard Feynman said, “It has been a mystery ever since it was discovered more than fifty years ago, and all good theoretical physicists put this number up on their wall and worry about it.” Being a good theoretical physicist, Smolin fully appreciates the force behind Feynman’s mystery.
But the most significant piece of scientific knowledge we have about these constants, the only clue physicists have to help explain their strange values, is the discovery that they’re fine tuned. If their special and improbable values were slightly different, there would be no atoms, molecules, planets, stars, galaxies, or life. Smolin was one of the first to emphasize and call attention to this fine tuning, even before the 1998 discovery of the fine tuning of the cosmological constant.
However, the only two theories that use fine tuning to explain the values of the constants are an intelligent cause and an infinite varied multiverse. This is a major problem for Smolin. On the one hand, the explanation of an intelligent cause isn’t available to Smolin because of his self-imposed first principle of cosmology that God doesn’t exist. As he writes in the last chapter of his 2001 book “Three Roads to Quantum Gravity” (page 201):
If we want to stick to our principle that there is nothing outside the universe, then we must reject any mode of explanation in which order is imposed on the universe by an outside agency. Everything about the universe must be explicable only in terms of how the laws of physics have acted in it over the whole span of its history.
On the other hand, Smolin vehemently opposes the multiverse solution to fine tuning because it’s unscientific and inherently flawed, for all the reasons we’ve already mentioned in this series. So that explanation isn’t available to him either.
Therefore, to explain the constants, Smolin hoped that Cosmological Natural Selection would show that the values of the constants should evolve under the unintelligent guidance of a meta-law to result in the special values we observe today. He anticipated that this would finally answer the question, “Why do the constants of nature have their specific values?” in a manner that undermines the natural implication of fine tuning and shows that there really is no purpose to the values of the constants. According to his theory, the appearance of fine tuning is merely due to a quirk of nature; since new universes are born in black holes, the values of the constants blindly evolve to maximize black hole production, with all the structure and complexity in the universe being an accidental by-product.
However, at the end of his multiple-decade journey, Smolin realized that even if he ignored his theory’s false prediction and its other problems, he would still be left with the intrinsic problem of explaining the exact form of the meta-law itself! In other words, even if his theory successfully explained away the clue of fine tuning, Smolin would find himself right back in a modified form of what Feynman called one of the greatest damn mysteries in physics. Instead of Feynman’s mystery of explaining the cause of the constants, Smolin would face the mystery of explaining the cause of the meta-law that governs the evolution of the constants.
In the last chapter of his 2013 book, Time Reborn, Smolin discusses this problem, which he calls the meta-laws dilemma. (page 243). He wrote as follows:
But suppose there is a meta-law. Shouldn't we want to know why this meta-law, rather than a different one, governs the evolution of laws in our universe? And if a meta-law may act on past laws to produce laws in the future, part of the explanation for what the laws are presently will depend on what those past laws were, so we can't avoid the Why these initial conditions? question. The meta-law hypothesis could lead to an infinite regression (Why this meta-law? might be answered by meta-meta-laws, and so on). This is one horn of the dilemma. The other is the possibility that there is no meta-law. There would then be an element of randomness in the evolution of the laws, the result again being that not everything is explainable and the principle of sufficient reason is flouted at the very foundation of science. Roberto Mangabeira Unger and I call this the meta-laws dilemma.
You may be wondering: How did Smolin react to this startling recognition? Did it cause him to question his first principle that God doesn’t exist?
Well, not exactly. After realizing that explaining away the clue of fine tuning leads Cosmological Natural Selection right into the meta-laws dilemma, Smolin describes his reaction as follows:
It might look at first like a dead end, but after living with it for several years I have come to believe that it is, instead, a great scientific opportunity, a provocation to invent a new kind of theory that will resolve it. I'm convinced that the meta-laws dilemma is solvable and that how it is solved will be the key to the breakthroughs that will enable cosmology and fundamental physics to progress in this century.
We agree with Smolin that the meta-law dilemma presents a great opportunity for him to recognize a new kind of theory. We just think that this new theory might violate his first principle that “there is nothing outside the universe”.
The meta-laws dilemma underscores the conclusion that in order to solve Feynman’s mystery of the constants, one must utilize the great clue of fine tuning. You can’t get rid of the only illuminating scientific knowledge we have about the constants just because you don’t like its natural implication. Once you realize, as Smolin does, the inherent flaws of an infinite varied multiverse, it becomes absolutely clear that fine tuning in our one universe indicates the existence of an intelligent cause.
It’s time for Smolin, and scientists like him, to reconsider the unjustified premise that God doesn’t exist. It’s time for scientists to openly recognize that the fine tuned values of our constants lead directly from physics to God.
While this essay discussed the only scientific attempt to explain the fine tuned constants without either an intelligent cause or a multiverse, our next two essays will examine Roger Penrose and Paul Steinhardt’s separate attempts to explain the Big Bang’s incredibly low entropy initial conditions.
Even though Steinhardt’s Bouncing Cosmology and Penrose’s Conformal Cyclic Cosmology are very speculative, they’re also very interesting. We’ll provide a basic explanation of these two theories and evaluate if they truly explain our highly ordered initial conditions without an intelligent cause.
Comments